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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH N. SILLIMAN and
UTAH ALLOY ORES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs-Apellants,
vs.
REX T. POWELL, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appeal No. 17054

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This suit was commenced by plaintiffs-appellants to
quiet title to their unpatented lode mining claims in the
unorganized mining district known as Yellow Cat, located in
Grand County, Utah, after defendants-respondents attempted to
locate claims overlying those of appellants, to recover damages
for slander of title, and to recover treble damages under Utah
Code Ann.

§

40-1-12 (1953), for ores wrongfully removed from

some of said claims.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was tried before the Honorable A. John
Ruggeri, Judge Pro Tern of the Seventh Judicial District in and
for Grand County, sitting without a jury, on March 19-23, 1979,
-1-
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and on April 3, 1979.

During the trial, defendant Penromer Co.

Ltd. entered into a stipulation of settlement with plaintiffsappellants and with Powell defendants (Trial Transcript,
Friday, March 23, 1979 at 679-81).

A settlement of all issues

between the plaintiffs-appellants and Rowe defendants was
stipulated to soon after trial on May 14, 1979, and was
recorded June 5, 1979.

All remaining parties then submitted

briefs to the court which issued its Memorandum Decision August
30, 1979, in favor of the defendants-respondents.

When

respondents finally submitted proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law in late January 1980, appellants made formal
objections to the failure of the findings to specify, inter
alia, the value of assessment work done benefitting appellants'
claims.

Objections were also made to the mischaracterization

of the settlement between appellants and Rowe defendants, to
the inclusion of findings of fact on issues settled between the
parties, and to conclusions of law based on the objectionable
findings (Record at 262-64).

As approved by the court in

unaltered form, these findings and conclusions stated that
appellants failed to meet their alleged burden of showing that
the assessment work done by appellants for assessment years
ending September 1, 1973, through September 1, 1977, was
sufficient in both character and amount to meet the
requirements of 30 U.S.C.

§

28, and thus the court found that

the relocations subsequently made by defendants-respondents
over appellants' claims were valid.
-2-
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Although appellants showed that substantial assessment
work had been done for their claims, the court in effect ruled
that since it found the work insufficient to satisfy the
assessment requirement as to all claims, the work was
insufficient to meet the requirement as to any claims.

The

court's failure to make any findings as to the actual value of
the assessment work done by the appelllants apparently resulted
from this conclusion.
The final decree of the court, entered February 13,
1980, while in some

measu~e

correcting the findings as to the

nature of the stipulations of settlement entered into between
appellants on the one hand and the Rowe and Penromer defendants
on the other hand (though misstating the date of the
appellants-Penromer stipulation as March 22, 1979, instead of
March 23, 1979), otherwise quieted title to all claims in
conflict in the respondents.

The decree also dismissed

appellants' damage claims, dissolved a temporary restraining
order and temporary injunction previously entered prohibiting
respondents from removing or selling uranium ore from the
claims in conflict until entry of the final judgment, and
awarded respondents their costs.

The Findings of Fact and

Final Decree were later amended by court order of March 12,
1980, adding six mining claims of Powell respondents included
in their counterclaim, but inadvertently omitted from the
original findings and decree.
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A motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure based on the discovery of new evidence
and accompanied by supporting affidavits was made by appellants
March 12, 1980, and denied the same day.

The notice of appeal

was also filed March 12, 1980.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants request that this Court reverse and vacate
the judgment and findings of the Seventh Judicial District
Court for Grand County, and remand this case for a new trial on
the issue of the adequacy and sufficiency of the assessment
work performed by appellants on their claims during the period
September 1, 1972, through September 1, 1978.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This lawsuit was filed by appellants January 10, 1977,
to quiet title to eighty-four (84) unpatented lode mining
claims and one millsite situated in the Yellow Cat mining
district in Grand County, Utah.

These claims of appellants are

valuable principally for their uranium and vanadium deposits.
Virtually all of the claims are situated more or less along a
three and one-half to four-mile long axis extending from the
Little Pittsburgh No. 8 in the northeast corner to the Molly
Hogans and the Silver Moon in the extreme southwest corner.
All but eight (8) of the 84 claims are part of a single,
continuous, multi-branching chain of overlapping and
-4-
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immediately adjoining claims. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibits nos. 11
and 12.)
Twenty-six of the appellants' claims were originally
located prior to 1937 and were deeded to appellant Utah Alloy
Ores, Inc. in 1937.

The balance of the claims were located by

Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. during the years 1938 through 1956
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2).

In February and December of 1976,

appellant Kenneth N. Silliman acquired in his own name from
appellant Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. all but three (3) of the 84
claims.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 29.)

Also in 1976, appellant

Silliman, with members of his immediate family, became a
controlling shareholder of Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. (Trial
Transcript [hereinafter Tr.] at 279).
Since May 1948, appellant Kenneth N. Silliman has been
associated with the property at issue in this suit and with
plaintiff Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. (Tr. at 278-79).

Appellant

Silliman first began performing assessment work on the claims
in 1948 and from the early 1950's he has served as Utah Manager
and as a Director of Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. (Tr. at 281-82).

In

those capacities appellant Silliman has, from the early 1950s,
been very much involved with the development of the claims and
the drilling and mining thereon, with the hiring of miners,
with the negotiation of contracts, both with drilling companies
and with receiving stations, and with the negotiation of leases
of the claims both to others and to himself (Tr. at 281-82).
During the period 1948 to 1972, there was continuous mining
-5-
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activity on appellants' claims (Tr. at 312).

During those

years, appellant Silliman built roads servicing the claims (Tr.
at 306), performed other assessment work on the property (Tr.
at 307, 315), assisted in the location of new claims and in the
posting of notices (Tr. at 291), hauled ore from the claims
(Tr. at 283, 310-11), and supervised mining activities on the
claims (Tr. at 311).

Appellant Silliman also managed drilling

exploration of the area for a subsidiary corporation of Utah
Alloy Ores, Inc. (Tr. at 314) and evaluated drilling logs and
established the course of the drilling program (Tr. at 314-15,
328).

He also consulted with numerous outside geologists about

the mining claims in the Yellow Cat area (Tr. at 315, 351).

In

short, appellant Silliman became thoroughly familiar with the
places on these claims where drilling had been done and ore had
been mined, or where there was an outcrop of anything that
would indicate the presence of mineralization (Tr. at 300).
The dispute in this case arose as a consequence of the
attempted location by respondents, in the years 1974 to 1978,
of claims overlying those of appellants.

The first of these

conflicting claims to be located was a group of twenty (20)
claims located by respondents Powells in April 1974.

Another

sixty-eight (68) claims were located by Powells the summer of
the following year during the period June 16, 1975 to August
23, 1975.

Nine (9) more claims were located by Powells from

September 18, 1975 to July 12, 1976, for a total of
ninety-seven (97) Powell claims (Defendants' Exhibit 60).
-6-
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The

greater number of these claims conflict with one or more of all
except about a dozen of appellants' 84 claims.
The other unresolved claims conflicting with those of
appellants are twelve (12} located by Teares, or their
predecessors in interest, five (5) in the period June 4 to
August 25, 1977, and seven (7) more located in the

i~terval

September 4, 1977 to May 10, 1978 (Defendants' Exhibit 78}.
All of these Teare claims were located after the filing of this
lawsuit on January 10, 1977.
The parties agree that the area in dispute was open to
location under federal law at the time the parties located
their respective claims except insofar as the land may have
been withdrawn by the prior location of other mining claims.
All respondents, with the exception of the Rowes who have
entered into a separate stipulation of settlement with
appellants, have also admitted that appellants' claims were
located prior to those of respondents (Record at 116).

The

only evidence offered at trial on the issue of whether the land
occupied by appellants' claims had previously been located by
others not parties and thus made unavailable for location by
appellants failed to demonstrate such prior location by anyone
1

else (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2, Defendants' Exhibit 18, Tr. at
174-79, 205, 211, 216-17, 660-62, 931-33}.
By stipulations, the parties have agreed that there is
no issue of the discovery of ore on each of appellants' claims
with the exception of Little Pittsburgh 1, Little Pittsburgh 2,
-7-
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Mineral Alloy 2, Mineral Alloy 3, Telluride 4 and Parco 1 (Tr.
at 548-49 and Stipulation for Settlement of Issues between
Plaintiffs and Rowe Defendants, dated May 14, 1979, part of the
Record on appeal but erroneously not numbered as a part
thereof).

However, at the trial uncontroverted evidence

established that ore was mined and shipped from Little
Pittsburghs 1 and 2 in the period 1951 to 1954 (Tr. at 17-18,
38, 57-58, 383-84).

In 1954, at least 50 tons of ore were

mined and shipped from Parco 1 (Tr. at 386).

Also, drilling in

1952 on Telluride 4, Mineral Alloy 2, and Mineral Alloy 3
revealed the presence of uranium oxide ore fairly evenly
distributeq with a concentration of eight one-hundreths of one
per cent (.08% 0308)

(Tr. at 383-86).

An engineering student hired to survey the existing
claims of appellant in 1953 and 1954 testified that almost all
discovery monuments were then in place on the ground with
discovery notices posted, that many corner monuments were
found, and that where missing or in need of improvement, the
corner and discovery monuments were reconstructed and that all
missing notices of location were replaced (Tr. at 9-11,
28-29).

This work was attested to by appellant Silliman (Tr.

at 288-89, 491-92, 936-37).

The balance of appellants' claims,

located in 1956 after the land was reopened to entry, were
marked by discovery and corner monuments placed there by
appellant Silliman, who also posted appropriate notices of
location on the newly located claims (Tr. at 937-39).
-8-
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of location for all the foregoing claims to which appellants
assert title were subsequently recorded (Plaintiffs' Exhibits
2, 27, Tr. at 283-85).
The trial court seems to have implicitly recognized
that all requirements for the valid location of appellants'
claims were met as it directed its findings only to the issues
of abandonment and the adequacy of the assessment work done by
appellants (R. at 121-22) .
When some of the claims were later surveyed in 1956
and again in 1965, many of appellants' corner monuments were
still standing, and those that were not were re-erected or
replaced (Tr. at 62-63, 65, 75-76, 78-79, 81-82, 108, 494-96).
During the 1970s, whenever appellant Silliman saw corner
monuments that were down, he re-erected them (Tr. at 498-500).
When in 1978, after the filing of the suit, some of the
appellants' claims were resurveyed, the surveyor noted the
presence of many of appellants' corner monuments, though some
but not all of the notices identifying the claims delineated by
the monuments had been removed or obliterated over time (Tr. at
125-29, 130).

Respondents also introduced evidence tending to

show that some of appellants' monuments or notices had
deteriorated or otherwise been lost over the years prior to
respondents' attempted relocation of appellants' claims (Tr. at
565, 575, 583, 593, 632-33, 683-84, 688, 730, 792, 795-96,
813-14, 842-43, 895).

Yet, as respondents acknowledged seeing

old monuments and mine workings, the thrust of their
-9-
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observations went not to a complete absence of markings but
merely to respondents' difficulty in identifying in the field
the extent, ownership, and current status of the old claims
(Tr. at 565, 632-37, 638, 675-76, 682-84, 690, 730-31, 797 800,
842, 891, 895).
The Powell respondents.testified they "asked around"
and otherwise attempted to ascertain the current owners and
status of possibly conflicting claims that might be prior to
their own and that this undertaking did not disclose
appellants' interest (Tr. at 565-67, 632-638).

This was

contradicted by evidence that Mr. Bene, one of the previous
surveyors of some of the appellants' claims, told Powells in
August 1975, while on the property in issue to survey Powells'
newly located claims, that he thought appellants had a current
and valid interest in the same area {Tr. at 73-75).

This

conversation was denied by respondent Dan Powell {Tr. at
610-13), who admitted, however, that Powells understood the law
to say that monuments on the ground need not be maintained once
properly erected {Tr. at 594).

Mr. Bene further stated that

Powells' response to being informed of appellants' interest in
the property was to say the validity of this interest turned on
"whether the assessment work has been done during the last few
years" {Tr. at 75).
Extensive testimony was heard at trial on the nature
and sufficiency of the assessment work performed by appellants
to meet the annual one hundred dollars ($100) worth of labor
-10-
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per claim required by 30 U.S.C.

§

28 for the assessment years

ending September 1, 1973, through September 1, 1977.

These

were the years immediately preceding the dates of respondents'
attempted relocation of appellants' claims.
Most of the appellants' assessment work was done with
a Caterpillar D-6 B bulldozer with a 12 1/2-foot blade, which
was owned by appellant Silliman (Tr. at 306-307).

The

bulldozer was operated primarily by appellant Silliman,
although occasionally appellant's son Blaine Silliman operated
the bulldozer as well.

An outside party was once hired to

operate the bulldozer for a day or two (Tr. at 398-400).
Appellant Silliman typically operated the bulldozer 10 to 12
hours a day while performing the assessment work, and
occasionally up to 14 hours a day (Tr. at 401).

Silliman's

objective was to work at least 200 hours a year doing
assessment work for the benefit of appellants' claims (Tr. at
402, 445).

Appellant Silliman calculated the value to his

claims of his personal operation of the bulldozer or that of
another operator working under his direct supervision at $50
per hour (Tr. at 407).

While appellant Silliman was not

actually paid $50 per hour by appellant Utah Alloy Ores, Inc.,
this was apparently because Silliman had the claims under lease
from 1961 on, and a condition of the lease was that he perform
the assessment work (Tr. at 475).

Even working for other

parties on other property, appellant Silliman would charge
approximately $30 an hour (Tr. at 405-407).
-11-
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Respondents attempted to produce evidence of a lower
valuation per hour for the assessment work done by appellants
by introducing testimony that in 1971 one independent
contractor charged $16 per hour for a 06 Caterpillar with an
operator (Tr. at 648).

However, respondents' witness testified

that rates had gone up tremendously since that time.
Furthermore, the quoted rate did not include any charge for the
supervision of such an outside operator necessary to insure
that the proper work was done to develop the claims.

Another

independent operator testified for respondents that for the
operation of a 06 Caterpillar with a blade on it he charged $15
per hour in 1972; $17 in 1973; $20 in 1974; $23 in 1975; $25 in
1976; $30 in 1977; $34 in 1978; and $40 in 1979 (Tr. at 830).

Again, these rates did not apparently include any charge for
the supervision of this work by the owner of the mining
claims.

Furthermore, this contractor stated that he would

charge an additional amount for the time necessary to haul the
Caterpillar to and from the job site.

The rates for hauling

the equipment to the job site and back were usually within a
dollar or two of what was charged for the operation of the
Caterpillar (Tr. at 831).
Much of the assessment work during the years in issue
was done by appellant Silliman with his bulldozer in stripping
or removing the overburden from potential ore bodies, in
constructing drill sites for future drilling, in preserving the
existing mine workings, and in maintaining and improving
-12-
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existing roads and constructing new roads on or about
appellants' claims.

These roads facilitated the development

and mining of these claims by providing access to the claims
and the ore bodies thereunder for drilling rigs, ore trucks,
and all other necessary vehicles (Tr. at 306, 349-83).
More specifically, the assessment work for appellants'
claims, broken down year by year, included the following:
For the assessment year September 1, 1972, to September 1, 1973
1.

Drill sites at least 20 feet wide built on the Little
Pittsburgh claim nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and on Allor 11 and
Allor 12 which drill sites were used two or three
years later for actual drilling.

2.

Normal road maintenance and rehabilitation that
included widening roads to facilitate the passage of
larger equipment on the property and the reducing of
grades on hills too steep to be negotiated by trucks
and drill rigs.

3.

Stripping of overburden on the Little Pittsburgh
claims nos. 3 and 4.
Hours

Date

63
65
84
212

October 1972
November 1972
August 1973
Total

At $50 per hour this equals $10,600 (Tr. at 349-55).
Assessment work valued at $8,400 would have been sufficient to
preserve all of appellants' eighty-four (84) claims, had all 84
been located over during the following year, which they were
not.
Powells located twenty (20) claims on April 12, 1974,
hoping to take advantage of alleged deficiencies in the
assessment work performed by appellants during 1972-1973.
-13-
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These Powell claims conflict with the following eight (8)
claims of appellants:
Allor 21-23;
Molly Hogan 1 & 2;
Telluride 5, 8 & 9.
(Compare Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 with Defendants' Exhibit 58.)
For the assessment year September 1, 1973 to September 1, 1974
1.

Approximately 20 hours work stripping the overburden
on Memphis 1 and Memphis 4.

2.

Clearing drill sites on Little Pittsburgh No. 4 for
the subsequent Bogner drilling [1976-77 & 1977-78] and
approximately 20 to 25 hours work clearing drill sites
on Telluride 8 and 9.

3.

Approximately 10 hours work building dams around the
portals on Allor 12 with the construction of ditches
to carry water away from the mines so they would not
be unduly damaged.

4.

Road maintenance and rehabilitation work.
Date

Hours

March 1974
August 1974
Total

110
93
203

At $50 per hour this equals $10,150 (Tr. at 355-59,
445-46) •

Powells located sixty-eight (68) claims in June
through August of 1975, hoping to take advantage of alleged
deficiencies in the appellants' assessment work for 1973-1974.
These Powell claims conflict with the following sixty-eight
(68) claims of appellants:
A 1-3;

Allor 1-9, 11-13, 15-23, & 26-33;
CB 1, 2, & 4-7;
Little Pittsburgh 3-8;
Memphis 1-4;
-14-
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Mineral Alloy No. 2;
Molly Hogan 1 & 2;
Parco 2, 5-7, 10, 23, & 25;
Skinney & Skinney No. l;
Telluride 2-4, 7-8, 12, 18 & 25.
(Compare Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 with Defendants' Exhibit
58.)
For the assessment year September 1, 1974, to September 1,
1975
1.

Approximately 30 hours preparing drill sites on Parco
23.

2.

About 20 hours preparing drill sites on Telluride 8
and 9 and on Allor 21 and 23.

3.

Twenty hours opening the portal on Telluride 8 and 9
and repairing the access road to the mine portal from
the haulage roads.

4.

Thirty hours work stripping overburden on Little
Pittsburgh 3 and 4.

5.

Five hours doing portal repair work on Allor 12.

6.

Road maintenance and rehabilitation including
specifically the portions down to and around the
Silver Moon, to Little Pittsburgh 1 and 2 and over to
Allor 12.
Hours

Date

90
1-22
212

September 1974
August 1975
Total
At $50 per hour this equals $10,600

(Tr~

at 359-61,

446-48).
The nine remaining Powell claims located between
September 18, 1975, and July 12, 1976, in hopes of taking
advantage of the alleged forfeiture for failure to do adequate
assessment work in 1974-1975, conflict with the following
twenty-two (22) claims of appellants:
-15-
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A 2; Allor 6-7, 13, 16-19, 24, 26-28, & 33;
Memphis 2 & 3;
Parco 6-7, 10, & 23;
Telluride 1, 7, & 18.
(Compare Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 with Defendants' Exhibit 58.)
For the assessment year September 1, 1975 to September 1, 1976
1.

More drill sites were built on Parco 23.

2.

Road maintenance and rehabilitation on all of the
primary roads in the area including specifically about
10 hours work on the road from Allor 1 across Mineral
Alloy 2 and 3 and Little Pittsburgh 2; and stripping
on Little Pittsburgh 1 and Little Pittsburgh 2.
Hours

Date

95
132
227

February 1976
August 1976
Total

At $50 per hour this equals $11,350 for the work done
by appellant Silliman with his bulldozer.
Additionally, on August 25, 1976, drilling work was
commenced by Schumacher Drilling and supervised by appellant
Silliman along a line or "fence" from Allor 12 along Little
Pittsburgh 6, Little Pittsburgh 5, Allor 11 to Little
Pittsburgh 3 and 4.

Though the drilling rig broke down August

26th, repairs were soon made and drilling recommenced September
12, 1976 and was completed by about September 20, 1976.

Some

21 holes were drilled for a total distance of 3,065 feet at a
charge per foot of $3 for probing, drilling, and logging
resulting in a total bill of $9,195 (Tr. at 361-70, 388,
533-34}.

The total value of all assessment work done by

appellants during this assessment year was, therefore, $20,545.
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The Teare claims named Lone Indian 1-5, located the
following summer between July 4, 1977, and August 25, 1977,
conflict with the following eight Silliman claims:
Allor 1 & 2;
Little Pittsburgh 1 & 2;
Mineral Alloy 2 & 3;
Telluride 4 & 25.
(Compare Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11 with Plaintiffs' Exhibit 107;
Tr. at 976-78.)
Assessment year from September 1, 1976 to September 1, 1977
1.

About five hours road work in the area of Little
Pittsburgh 1 and 2, Mineral Alloy 2 and 3, and
Telluride 4 which was stopped by Mr. Teare while
Silliman was working on Mineral Alloy 2 and 3.

2.

More drill sites built on Parco 23.

3.

General road maintenance and rehabilitation in the
area of all the claims.
Hours

Date

210

August 1977

At $50 per hour this equals $10,500 for bulldozer work.
Additionally, drilling work was done on Little
Pittsburgh 3 and 4, Allor 12, and on Telluride 8 and 9 by J & J
Drilling [Bogner] for a total distance of 1,060 feet at a
charge of $2 per foot for a total bill of $2,120 paid by
appellants.

This drilling penetrated ore bearing formation and

was evaluated by appellant Silliman.

These holes were logged

by Idaho Mining Company for an additional charge of $600 (Tr.
at 371-76, 388).

The total value of assessment work done by

appellants during this assessment year was, therefore, $13,220.

-17-
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Seven more claims were located by Teares after the
period of this work during the interval September 4, 1977 to
May 10, 1978, which claims conflict with the following claims
of appellant:
Mineral Alloy 2 & 3;
Parco l;
Telluride 4.
(See Defendants' Exhibits 83 and 85; Tr. at 906-913.)
For the assessment year September 1, 1977, to September 1, 1978
1.

More drill site work on Parco 23.
on Parco 23.

2.

About eight hours work repairing roads on Little
Pittsburgh 1 and 2, Mineral Alloy 2 and 3, and
Telluride 4.

3.

General maintenance and road rehabilitation work on
the main roads used when drilling or otherwise moving
across appellants property from one extremity of the
area to the other.
Date

Portal repair work

Hours

March 1978
April 1978
Total

105
90
195

At $50 per hour this bulldozer work equals $9,750.
Again, more drilling was done by Bogner on Allor 12,
Little Pittsburgh 6, Little Pittsburgh 5, Little Pittsburgh 4,
and on Telluride 8 and 9 and on Memphis 1 through S.

These

holes were drilled on some of the drill sites prepared during
the previous four years.

Bogner drilled 2,110 feet at a charge

of $2 per foot for a total bill of $4,220.

The holes were

logged by appellant Silliman's son and evaluated by the
Sillimans (Tr. at 376-81).

The total value of assessment work
-18-
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done by appellants during this assessment year was, therefore,
$13,970.
The work done during this assessment year is relevant
as showing the good faith of appellants in continuing to
develop their mining claims even after commencement of the
suit, although respondents did not attempt to locate additional
mining claims conflicting with those of appellants in the
period following this assessment year.
Appellant Silliman testified at trial that he did not
go over each and every road each year as some of the roads
either did not need much work or were not being used
sufficiently to justify the work (Tr. at 963-65).

He did

affirm, however, that over a period of about three years,
almost every road would be checked or maintained with the
possible exception of those going to Parco 1, Parco 3, and
Parco 3 East (Tr. at 382-83).

Appellants' primary concern was

not to maintain every road on the property, but only those main
or principal roads whose use was expected to be more frequent
and necessary for the transport of drills and other equipment
to the claims.

However, maintenance work was intentionally

omitted from the short stretch of road leading to the main camp
where buildings and equipment were located to reduce the
possibility of looting (Tr. at 449-51, 963).
When respondents questioned the value of appellants'
annual program of maintenance of the principal roads,
especially for years when no drilling or mining equipment was
-19-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

carried over those roads, appellant Silliman pointed out that
the annual flashflooding and sand drifting in the area has a
cumulative effect that would not allow for the saving of any
significant amount of repair work or time if postponed for any
period of time (Tr. at 536-37).

Furthermore, when appellants

offered to prove the increased size of more modern drilling and
mining equipment in justification of appellants' improvement
program of road widening, respondents' objection was sustained
by the court (Tr. at 323).
Respondents also questioned whether appellants
performed all of the assessment work they claimed to have done
(Tr. at 963-65).

Respondents attempted to show that not all of

this work claimed by appellants was performed by introducing
photographs of roads that obviously had not been improved or
maintained for a while (Defendants' Exhibits 61-65, Tr. at
618-27).

Three of the five photos depicted either the road

leading to the main camp that Silliman had already testified he
purposely did not maintain to prevent looting (Tr. at 449-50),
or another road in the same area that had long since been
abandoned (Tr. at 450).

The two other photographs, Exhibits 63

and 65, taken in 1977, showed little used and therefore little
maintained roads in areas where Powells had attempted
relocations over two years previously.
Respondents also offered vague testimony to the effect
that those attempting to relocate claims in the disputed area
noticed little or no evidence of recent assessment work (Tr at
-20-
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606, 709, 842}.

Yet respondents introduced nothing else to

contradict the detailed recital of assessment work performed by
appellants for their claims, although respondents did try to
bolster their weak attack on the quantity of assessment work
performed by appellants by implying Silliman's memory and
credibility were suspect since he produced virtually no written
records from the time the assessment work was done to verify
his account of that work (Tr. at 346, 420-26}.

When later

Silliman discovered a few such records, they were promptly
disclosed and tendered (R. at 285-95}.

Furthermore,

respondents introduced nothing to contradict the tendency of
the work done by appellants to benefit their claims or to show
that this work was done with any other intent than to develop
the claims.

Indeed, evidence of assessment work done by

respondents showed they had engaged in the same type of road
work, drill site excavation, and drilling as appellants (Tr. at
653-58, 750-53, 800-811, 967-73}.
Appellant Silliman repeatedly testified to his intent
to benefit all of his claims with his general roadwork program
and to his belief that all the claims actually were so
benefitted by this work (Tr. at 349, 355, 358-59, 361-62, 373,
378-79, 535}.

He substantiated this belief by testifying to

the way in which the underlying uranium was deposited along
trends paralleled by the overlying mining claims.

He pointed

out that information yielded from one area of the claims also
benefits the other areas.

Thus roads required to explore and
-21-
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service one part of the claims also benefit even outlying
portions of the larger group of claims (Tr. at 535) •
Silliman's testimony on this point was buttressed by
that of Mr. James R. Andrus, an exploration geologist with
twenty-two years of experience in exploring for and mining
uranium, who had examined the area of appellants' claims in the
company of Silliman and another geologist and mining engineer
of his employer, Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc. (Tr. at 225-27,
230-32).

Andrus testified that the results of the mining on

appellants claims demonstrated that the uranium there was "in
trend" (Tr. at 234).

He went on to say that where a trend is

established, it is there for five miles and can be used almost
that far (Tr. at 242).

When pressed by counsel for respondents

as to how far the benefit extended from any drill hole, Andrus
advocated an exploration program of widely-spaced drilling at
intervals of approximately one-half mile, but he refused to
limit the benefit from even barren holes to such a limited
distance (Tr. at 239-41).

Continuing, Andrus stated that with

a knowledge of the presence of a trend and something· about how
it was situated, drilling up on the Little Pittsburgh claims in
the northeast corner of appellants' group could well benefit
claims down in the far southwest corner such as the Allor 23
(Tr. at 242-43).

Although he indicated that a small mining

operator, due to limited funds and the inability to explore out
very far, might only receive benefit within a 500 foot radius
from a drill hole, he also stated that given the history of
-22-
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appellant's claims, he "would look as far as the claims that
controlled would allow me to look" (Tr. at 248, 240).

I

Finally,

he indicated that the results for each hole drilled, when added
together with the results of all previous exploratory efforts
in the area, contribute positively to an overall picture and
understanding of the ore formations in the general area (Tr. at
267).

No attempt was made to rebut this expert testimony with

testimony from another witness.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT MISAPPLIED THE STANDARDS OF LAW
APPLICABLE TO THE COMMON DEVELOPMENT OF
ASSOCIATED MINING CLAIMS.

Once validly located on ground open to location under
federal law, an unpatented mining claim may continue to be held
by the original locators or their successors free of any
interest asserted by those who subsequently attempt to locate
the same area as long as the requirements of 30
met.

u.s.c.

§

28 are

In part, those requirements read:
On each claim located after the 10th day of May 1872,
and until a patent has been issued therefor, not less
than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or
improvements made during each year . • • • but where
such claims are held in common, such expenditure may
be made upon any one claim; and upon a failure to
comply with these conditions, the claim or mine upon
which such failure occurred shall be open to
relocation in the same manner as if no location of the
same had ever been· made, provided that the original
-23-
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locators, their heirs, assigns, or legal
representatives, have not resumed work on the claim
after failure and before such location.
In a leading decision of the United States Supreme
Court holding that the owner of a group of adjoining mining
claims need not seek a separate patent for each, Justice Field
for the majority of the Court noted that under the Act of May
10, 1872 containing the provision just quoted:
Labor and improvements within the meaning of the
statute, are deemed to have been had on a mining
claim, whether it consists of one location or several,
when the labor is performed or the improvements are
made for its development, that is, to facilitate the
extraction of metals it may contain, though in fact
such labor and improvements may be on ground which
originally constituted only one of the locations, as
in sinking a shaft, or be at a distance from the claim
itself, as where the labor is performed for the
turning of a stream, or the introduction of water, or
where the improvements consist in the construction of
a flume to carry off the debris or waste material.
Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 636, 655 (1882).
The nature of the annual labor requirement for claims
held in common was elaborated upon by the Court the following
year in a case squarely presenting the issue of the
satisfaction of the above statute.
440 (1883).

Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S.

The plaintiff was the senior locator of several

adjoining mining claims.

A flume was built to carry the waste

material from the mining work on one of the claims to an
adjoining claim.

The claim where the tailings were deposited

was covered by such waste to an extent greater than one-third
of its area.

No other work on or for the benefit of the

half-buried claim was shown.

The Court held that the plaintiff
-24-
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had established no right to the adjoining claim on the
receiving end of the flume.

Justice Field, speaking for a

unanimous Court, declared at 444:
The contention of the plaintiff was made upon a
singular misapprehension of the meaning of the act of
Congress, where work or expenditure on one of several
claims held in common is allowed in place of the
required expenditure on the claims separately. In
such case the work or expenditure must be for the
purpose of developing all of the claims. It does not
mean that all the expenditure upon one claim which has
no reference to the development of the others will
answer.
The Court continued its elaboration of the benefit
requirement for the common development of claims in Chambers v.
Harrington, 111 U.S. 350 (1884.).

In this case, on appeal from

the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah whose decision is
reported at 3 Utah 94, 1 P. 362 (1882), the primary issue was
whether the sinking of a shaft in one claim benefited two other
adjoining claims so as to preserve them from relocation by an
adverse party.

In affirming the finding of the trial court

that the adjoining claims were so benefitted, the Utah Court
quoted from Mt. Diablo Mill & Mining Company v. Callison, Fed.
Cas. No. 9886, 5 Sawyer 439, 9 Morr. Min. Rep. 616, 632-33
(C.C. Nev. 1879), as follows:
Work done outside of the claim, or outside of any
claim, if done for the purpose or as a means of
prospecting or developing the claim, as in the case of
tunnels, drifts, etc., is as available for holding the
claim as if done within the boundaries of the claim
itself. One general system may be formed, well
adapted and intended to work several contiguous claims
or lodes, and when such is the case, work in
furtherance of the system is work on the claims
intended to be developed by it.
-25-
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Utah Court finding the adjacent claims benefitted by the
shaft on the other claim.

It borrowed the same language quoted

by the Utah Court for its statement of the benefit requirement
and added to it, at 111 U.S. 353, the following:
When several claims are held in common, it is in
the line of this policy to allow the necessary work to
keep them all alive, to be done on one of them. But
obviously on this one the expenditure of money or
labor must equal in value that which would be required
on all the claims if they were separate or
independent. It is equally clear that in such case
the claims must be contiguous so that each claim thus
associated may in some way be benefitted by the work
done on one of them.
Three main elements of the rule for the development of
claims held in common emerge from a consideration of the
classic passages set out above.

First, the work must actually

tend toward the development of the claims; i.e., it must
benefit the claims by leading to the extraction of the minerals
in place under the claims.
to benefit the claims.

Secondly, the work must be intended

In other words, the efforts expended

must have as their purpose the eventual extraction of the
minerals.

Finally, the work must be so organized as to benefit

or lead to the development of the entire group of claims held
in common.
assist.

A reformulation of this final element may also

The government's interest is to see that as much of

the minerals in the ground are extracted as possible.

work

benefitting only one or a few but substantially less than all
claims will not accomplish this result.
-26-
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should be some systematic approach that will tend to the
development of substantially all the claims held in common and
intended to be developed as a group.
Mining claims are of ten best mined on a consolidated
basis.

Yet it may be virtually impossible to simultaneously

develop all claims at one and the same time.

Therefore, if

work is so organized that it tends to the benefit of all the
claims, even though work at any one moment may be concentrated
on one or a few claims, this third element would be satisfied.
This Court succinctly captured the essense of this third
element in Nevada Exploration & Mining Co. v. Spriggs, 41 Utah
171, 124 P. 770, 773 (1912), where it noted:
We think that what is intended by the use of the term
"system" or "general system" of work means simply
this: That the work, as it is commenced on the
ground, is such that, if continued, will lead to a
discovery and development of the veins or ore bodies
that are supposed to be in the claims, or, if these
are known, that the work will facilitate the
extraction of the ores and minerals. This latter
purpose is well illustrated by the Supreme Court of
Colorado in Doherty v. Morris, 17 Colo. 105 [28 P.
85], where it is held that the construction of a wagon
road leading to and making the claims accessible was
sufficient as assessment work to prevent forfeiture of
the claims.
Ample evidence was presented at trial supporting the
adequacy of the character of the assessment work performed by
appellants for the benefit of their claims.

The continued

exploration and development program advocated by Mr. Andrus, an
expert geologist who had examined the area in dispute, could
not be accomplished without roads suitably maintained to
provide access to the claims.

Drilling in the most propitious
-27-
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locations could not be accomplished without the excavation of
suitable drilling sites.

Pockets of shallowly deposited ore

could not be extracted without the removal of the overburden.
Furthermore, the drilling that was done in 1976, 1977, and 1978
gave evidence of appellants' good faith in engaging in the
preparatory work already described.

Therefore, the performance

by appellants of these and .other activities on and for the
benefit of their claims was unmistakably work tending to
develop the claims, thus fulfilling the first of the three
elements outlined.
Appellant Silliman testified that as to each
assessment year in issue, he intended the assessment work he
performed to benefit the entire group of claims owned by Utah
Alloy Ores, Inc. or himself.

Such testimony could only have

come from him because no one else performed any significant
amount of the assessment work.
support this view.

Inferences from objective facts

Appellant Silliman's long and continual

association with the property that had been actively mined and
explored for over 20 years uniquely qualified him to appreciate
the uranium deposits as yet unremoved.

As lessee and later

owner of these claims, Silliman had every incentive to develop
the claims and extract the uranium lying thereunder.

A great

deal of ore had already been mined from these claims over the
more than twenty years Silliman had been associated with the
property.

There could be no purpose to the work he performed

in the period 1972 to 1978 except the purpose of satisfying the
-28-
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assessment requirements.

Thus, the intent or purpose element

was clearly met.
Testimony on the tendency of the work performed to
develop the entire group of claims owned by appellants was
given not only by appellant Silliman but also by geologist
Andrus.

Andrus testified that the uranium deposits in the area

were clearly situated along a trend substantiated by previous
mining activity to extend for probably five miles.

He further

testified that the claims overlay the trend of the mineral
deposits and that, given what he knew of the geological
formations and the previous activity in the area, he would, as
an expert, continue exploration and development work as far as
the claims extended.

He indicated that the configuration of

drilling holes made in prior years was such as to maximize the
information yield that could be expected therefrom.

Finally,

he testified that each additional drill hole, whether barren or
not, yields information which, when added to what is already
known of the area, assists in adding more detail to the overall
picture of the mineral deposit.

The work carried on by Mr.

Silliman was such that it would lead, if continued, to the
discovery of new ore bodies and the extraction of known
deposits.

No attempt was made to offer additional testimony to

refute this evidence which establishes the presence of a
general system well adapted and intended to benefit all of
appellants' claims by leading to the extraction of the
underlying uranium.

Such a system, tending to develop all
-29-
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claims, satisfies the requirements of the third element
outlined above.
Yet the trial court made findings to the effect that
not only was this assessment work insufficient in quantity, but
that it was deficient in character.

The trial court's Finding

of Fact No. 18, reads in part:
The testimony of plaintiff on assessment work for
the various years was apparently re-constructed by
plaintiff after the present suit was filed as to
dates, the type of work performed and the value of
said assessment and there was no substantial testimony
showing plaintiff's intentions at the time the work
was performed as to the claims the work would benefit
and the extent and amount of such benefit.
Some of the assessment work claimed by plaintiff
was roadwork repeated each year over existing roads.
There was no evidence as to which claims were
benefitted by the road work and the extent in value of
the road work as to any particular claims. Some of
the assessment work was on millsites. There was no
evidence that this work on millsites benefitted any
particular claims or groups of claims, and there was
no evidence that any mills has been erected on the
millsites, and no evidence that plaintiff intended to
construct any mills on any of the millsites.

By reason of the above the Court is unable to
make a finding as to the value of assessment work
performed by plaintiff on any particular claim or
groups of claims for any of the assessment years in
question.
Record at 145-46.
The finding erroneously assumes that work in one
location on appellants' claims cannot benefit claims located
elsewhere along the chain of adjoining and overlapping claims
overlying the trend of mineral deposition unless discrete
benefit values can be assigned to specific individual claims.
-30-
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The trial court's approach demands that the total benefit of
such work accruing to an extended area of mineralization be
broken down into artifically small and somewhat arbitrary
segments that may be conveniently matched with individual
claims or smaller groups of claims forming only part of a
larger group.

This ignores not only the facts in this case but

the basic rationale for allowing claims to be developed by a
common plan.

Indeed, one requirement of a common development

scheme is that the work tend to benefit substantially all the
claims.

Jackson v. Roby.

It will only rarely be the case in

such circumstances that the benefit accruing to each claim from
such work may be precisely calculated.

Accordingly, appellants

submit that the trial court did not correctly apply the law to
the facts of the present case.

This is prejudicial error

requiring reversal.
Further indications that the trial court did not
adequately understand or apply the rules of law explained above
for the development of claims held in common are contained in
the trial court's reference in Finding of Fact No. 18 to
assessment work on millsites.
millsite.

First, appellants claim but one

Secondly, nowhere in his testimony does appellant

Silliman explicitly mention work on a millsite.

Thirdly,

millsites are not subject to the annual labor requirement.
Lindley on Mines§ 638 (3rd ed. 1914).

2

However, the trial

transcript is replete with references to drill sites upon which
significant work was expended to prepare the sites for later
-31-
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drilling, actually prosecuted, in many cases, within two to
four years.

It certainly appears that the trial court confused

both the facts and the law applicable thereto.
Road work has often been sustained as valid assessment
work. In Doherty v. Morris, 17 Colo. 105, 28 P. 85 (1891)'
cited with approval by this Court in Nevada Exploration and
Mining Co. v. SEriggs, as already noted, no ordinary
development work was done within the surf ace boundaries of the
claim found by the Supreme Court of Colorado to have been
preserved from relocation by the construction of a wagon road
up a gulch to the claim and to an adjoining claim.

At 28 P.

86, that court stated:
We do not hesitate to assert that labor
performed by the owner of a mine in
constructing a wagon road thereto for the
purpose of better developing and operating
the same may be treated as a compliance with
the law relating to annual assessment work
thereon.
The Washington State Supreme Court has upheld the
validity of road work when contested in Sexton v. Washington
Mining and Milling Co., 55 Wash. 380, 104 P. 614 (1909) and in
Florence-Rae Copper Co. v. Kimbel, 85 Wash. 162, 147 P. 881
(1915).

California district courts of appeal have done the

same in Ring v. United States Gupsum Co., 62 Cal. App. 87, 216
P. 409 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1923); Lind v. Baker, 31 Cal. App.
2d 631, 88 P.2d 777 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1939)

(rebuilding a

private road leading to several mining claims after it was
washed out in a flood); and Brown v. Murphy, 36 Cal. App. 2d
-32-
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161, 97 P.2d 281 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1939)

(the repair after

each rain of a good road leading to a group of claims) .
In Pinkerton v. Moore, 66 N.M. 11, 340 P.2d 844
(1959), the New Mexico Supreme Court found reconnaissance work
inadequate in character but treated the repair of access roads
as so patently beneficial to mining claims that it upheld this
road work as valid in character virtually as a per se matter.
The federal district court in United States v. 9,947.71 Acres
of Land, 320 F. Supp. 328 (D.C. Nev. 1963), seemed to be of the
same view.
The federal government, speaking through an acting
solicitor of the Department of the Interior in an opinion
entitled Rights of Mining Claimants to Access Over Public Lands
to their Claims, 66 I.D. 361 (1959), noted at 364 that:
The Department has recognized that roads were
necessary and complementary to mining activities. It
early adopted the policy of recognizing work done on
the construction of roads to carry ore from mining
claims as legitimate development work accreditable to
the claims as assessment and patent work.
The solicitor's opinion went on to note that this
early policy, after a brief hiatus at the turn of the century,
was reaffirmed in Tacoma & Roche Harbor Lime Co., 43 L.D. 128
(1914).

This case held that road work is to be considered

proper assessment work along the lines suggested by Lindley in
Sections 629 and 631 of his treatise.

Lindley notes the

necessity of roadways to develop mining claims and acknowledges
that expenditures to build roads for this purpose may be
credited toward assessment requirements.
-33-
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that roads are not necessarily mining improvements and urges
that roads built or maintained for other purposes do not
represent legitimate assessment work.
The road work performed by appellants satisfies these
common sense conditions.

The roads built and maintained by

appellants on or leading to their claims were constructed
exclusively for mining purposes.
Though this Court has not had many opportunities to
pass on the sufficiency of road work as assessment work, one
such case was New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co.,
102 Utah 131, 128 P.2d 269 (1942), cert. den. 319 U.S. 753
(1943).

There, the road work in question was the construction

of a road commenced the day before the end of the assessment
year.

While this Court held that the claimants could not rely

upon this work to satisfy the annual assessment requirement,
the reason for that holding was expressly given: The claimants
"failed to prove that they built the road." 128 P.2d at 272.
Had such proof been made, there is no intimation in the opinion
that the road work would have been disallowed.
Indeed, in Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 6 Utah 2d
51, 305 P.2d 503 (1957), this Court upheld the findings of the
trial court that repairing a pathway for access to claims was
adequate resumption of assessment work to preserve the claims
from relocation, and that the repair of existing roads to be
used in transporting ore that was to be mined later from the
claims was also good assessment work.
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Appellants concede that the determination of the
adequacy of assessment work is normally a matter for the trier
of fact.

~,

2 Lindley on Mines § 630, at 1555.

Yet

respondents introduced no evidence rebutting the beneficial
character of appellants' assessment work.

Respondents

restricted their attack to the sufficiency of the quantity of
the assessment work done.

A statement made by this Court in

New Mercur seems particularly apropos:
Appellant introduced no evidence discrediting the
above testimony; hence, it remains undisputed. There
does not appear in the record any evidence that the
work was a subterfuge, or done in bad faith. On the
contrary, there appears nothing but uncontradicted
testimony that the work was practical, tending to
develop the claims, and that it was done in good faith,
. • . • One general system was conceived and well
adapted in light of the physical surroundings and the
geological information then available.
(Citations
omitted.)
128 P.2d at 273.

The situation in the present case is exactly

that described above by the Court in New Mercur.
Although it is not clear from the obscurity of the
trial court's Memorandum Decision and the findings later
entered, it may be that the trial court thought the work of
appellants did not satisfy the "general system" requirement for
the development of claims held in common.

If so, this was error

at variance with what this Court stated in Nevada Exploration
and Mining Co. v. Spriggs, 124 P. at 772, to-wit:
There is some direct and positive evidence from expert
miners and mining engineers in the record that the
shaft and the drifts as constructed tended to develop
the whole group of claims, and that the work was also
proper as prospecting work. We think the trial court
was right in not substituting his own judgment for that
-35-
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of the mining men and engineers. The courts sho~ld be
very slow, indeed, in holding that certain work ~s not
calculated to develop certain mining claims, or is not
proper prospecting work, when there is competent
evidence that such is the effect of the work in
question, and where there is no evidence to the
contrary.
Appellants respectfully submit that the trial court in
the case at bar erred as a matter of law in demanding that the
road maintenance and improvement program of appellants should be
credited to only those particular claims upon which the physical
labor was actually expended in any given year or to those few
claims so immediately proximate thereto that might properly be
said, in different circumstances, to be the only claims
forseeably benefitted by such work.

Here, appellants' road

work, as undertaken on or leading to any particular claim in the
group, inured to the benefit of all other claims controlled by
appellants due to the extent and orientation of the underlying
ore bodies.
In addition to the three requirements set forth above,
it is often suggested that Chambers v. Harrington, supra,
established another requirement, that is, that the claims being
developed as a group all be contiguous.
Mines,

§

630 at 1551 (3rd ed. 1914).

~,

2 Lindley on

Yet Lindley notes that the

Supreme Court of Colorado, in Hain v. Mattes, 34 Colo. 345, 83
P. 127 (1905), concluded that, to quote Lindley at 1551, "the

decisions asserting or assuming the necessity for contiguity are
mere dicta, and that contiguity is a non-essential."

He then

notes that the California Supreme Court, in Big Three Mining
-36-
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Company v. Hamilton, 157 Cal. 130, 107 P. 301, 305 (1910), was
of the same opinion.

Lindley then states, at page 1552 of his

treatise:
If work done outside of a group of claims can be
credited to such group, it would seem logical that
work on a noncontiguous claim should be so credited,
provided, of course, that the work responded to the
general test of group development -- that is, that the
work done tends to develop all the claims in the
group.
The Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation agrees with
this latter statement.
Many of the cases which allow certain types of work
performed off a claim to count as assessment work only
if performed on contiguous claims, recognize that
other types of work performed off a claim may count as
assessment work even if performed outside the
boundaries of contiguous claims. [The passage from
Smelting Company v. Kemp set out above is then
quoted.] Roads to provide access to claims and ditches
to provide water for mining, will satisfy as
assessment work even though constructed outside of the
claim boundaries. Assessment work may be performed on
patent land, or even vacant public domain.
Accordingly, it would seem that the continguity test
is unrealistic, and that the true test should be
whether the work tends to benefit the particular
claim. (Footnotes omitted.)
2 American Law of Mining

§

7.18

(1~79).

This Court, though perhaps responsible for originating
the contiguity requirement in Harrington v. Chambers, 3 Utah
94, 1 P. 362, 371, in what is arguably dicta, has already given
limited recognition to the principle that work on a claim not
strictly contiguous to another may qualify as assessment work
for both claims.

This occurred in the New Mercur opinion.

The

case is most often cited for its exposition of the community of
interest principle, considered below.
-37-
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survey of the prior case law, however, this Court quoted an
extended passage from Hain v. Mattes, to the effect that work
on one claim, intended to benefit and actually benefitting
another claim, is sufficient in character as assessment work
for both claims regardless of whether the two claims are
actually contiguous.

In New Mercur, this Court approved the

statement of law from Hain v. Mattes except as to claims
separated by territory owned by a stranger (an exception made
out of apparent concern for a desire to avoid countenancing
trespasses).

128 P.2d at 274, 276.

Appellants respectfully submit that contiguity, as the
most strict degree of proximity, is probative of the extent of
the actual benefit conferred on one claim by work on another,
but that actual benefit can accrue without contiguity.
Appellants' eight claims not contiguous with the main body of
their claims did actually benefit from appellants' assessment
work and should be preserved.
To the extent community of interest is a further,
distinct requirement for the common development of claims, that
requirement is also satisfied in this case.

The essence of the

requirement is that there must be privity between the owner of
the claim for which the work was performed and the owner of the
property where the work was executed.

As mentioned, New Mercur

Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co. is the leading case on
the topic.

The facts of that case revealed that

A owned one

group of claims and B owned an adjoining group of claims.
-38-
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The

third party C had a lease from B with an option to purchase,
and C also had a lease from A.

The lessee,

c, performed work

in a tunnel upon a patented claim in B's group.

This Court

found that the work tended to benefit the claims owned by A and
that the lessor-lessee relationships constituted sufficient
privity.

The Court concisely stated the community of interest

principle in the following language from 128 P.2d at 275:
[T]here must be some common right in the
assessment work. The owner or owners of the
claims whose continued possessory right is
made to depend on the development work must
have a legal relationship to the work if it
is to inure to the benefit of the claim or
claims for which it is contended it was
done.
Where, as in the case at bar, the assessment work was
performed by the lessee and later owner of a largely contiguous
body of claims, or under his direct supervision, there could be
no clearer satisfaction of the community of interest
requirement.
The trial record plainly shows that appellants'
assessment work satisfied all requisite conditions imposed by
law for the common development of their mining claims.

By not

so finding, it is apparent that the trial court misapplied the
law to the facts, as well as made clearly erroneous ·findings of
fact relating to the quality of the assessment work.

-39-
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ASSESSMENT WORK.

The law does not favor forfeitures.
Top Mining Co., 6 Utah 2d 51, 305 P.2d 503

Knight v. Flat

(1957)~

New Mercur

Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., 102 Utah 131, 128 P.2d
269 (1942).

As this Court noted in New Mercur:

Because of
ordinarily
title must
convincing

this reluctance on the part of the law,
the party claiming the forfeiture of a
both plead and establish it by clear and
proof.
(Citations omitted.)

128 P.2d at 272.
The policy of avoiding forfeitures has received broad
support though the rule has been variously formulated.

The

Arizona Supreme Court, following the lead of the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Winslow v. Burns, 47 N.M. 29, 132 P.2d 1048
(1943), stated:
And as between a prior locator in possession and a
subsequent locator, the evidence of the prior locator
will be viewed in the most favorable light it will
justify.
Bagg v. New Jersey Loan Co., 88 Ariz. 182, 354 P.2d 40, 45
(1960).

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wyoming adheres to the

view that good faith attempts to comply with the law by a prior
locator are to be construed liberally

by the courts so as not

to defeat the prior locator's claim by technical criticism.
-40-
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Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 388
(1960).
This Court terms this approach favoring the senior
locator an "indubitably sound principle, universally applied by
courts in controversies over mining claims where forfeiture due
to failure to do the assessment work is in question" in Morgan
v. Sorenson, 3 Utah 2d 428, 286 P.2d 229, 231 (1955), where it
quoted Emerson v. Mcwhirter, 133 Cal. 510, 65 P. 1036, 1038
(1901), as follows:
Where a valid location of a m1n1ng claim has been
made, and work done thereon in good faith, possession
maintained, and no evidence appears from which an
intention to abandon may be inferred, the courts
should construe the law liberally, to prevent
forfeiture.
Although appellants have the burden to show by
substantial evidence that work performed outside the boundaries
of any claim forming part of a group being commonly developed
was both intended to develop the claim and did actually tend
toward its development, that does not in any sense alter the
ultimate burden of persuasion (or risk of nonpersuasion, as it
is sometimes called) borne by respondents to show by clear and
convincing proof that insufficient assessment work was done to
create a forfeiture.

The rule in New Mercur, which fails to

distinguish between the two very different burdens (see
McCormick on Evidence §336, 2nd ed. 1972), is not to the
contrary.

It merely states that a claimant who performs work

off a claim has the burden to show "that the work was done for
the development of all the claims and was so intended."
-41-
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P.2d at 272.

The reason for this "burden" is that such

information is peculiarly within the claimant's knowledge.
Where, as in this case, the appellants offered the only proof as
to the benefit of work performed, respondents could not possibly
be entitled to a forfeiture of appellants' claims.

Clear and

convincing rebuttal evidence would have been required.

Only

such an interpretation furthers the policy of favoring the first
locator in a contest with a subsequent locator.
Of course, wherever appellants performed assessment
work within the boundaries of any claim, they had no burden at
all to demonstrate that the work benefitted those claims.

It is

presumed that claims on which work is actually done benefit from
that work where the work is of proper character.

In order to

cause forfeiture of those claims, respondents would have to show
by clear and convincing proof that no work was actually done on
those claims and that work done elsewhere did not benefit those
claims.

Appellants submit that this course was not followed by

the trial court.
The following portion of the trial court's Memorandum
Decision reveals the improper framework used by the judge to
evaluate the evidence presented.
The evidence of the Plaintiffs does not convince the
Court that sufficient or adequate assessment work was
done in order to hold the conflict areas involved.
The testimony of the other witnesses define an
ostensible lack of assessment work, coupled with a
general deterioration of corner and discovery
monuments indicative of abandonment brought on by the
discontinuance of the productive mining venture that
existed in the years prior thereto.
Record at 121.
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Clearly, "an ostensible lack of assessment work" does not
rise to the level of clear and convincing proof that adequate
assessment work was not performed, which is what the law
requires before the respondents can prevail.
The concluding phrase of the quoted passage reflects
further confusion in the court's mind.

The court seemed to

treat the deterioration of corner and discovery monuments as
objective evidence indicative of abandonment and used that
"evidence" to buttress the "ostensible lack of assessment
work."

This confuses two very distinct concepts in the law of

mining -- abandonment and forfeiture.

In 2 Lindley on Mines

§

643, at 1596-98, the distinction is expressed as follows:
Abandonment is always a question of intention.
In forfeiture the element of intent is not
involved. It rests entirely upon the statute, and
involves only the question, whether the terms of the
law have been complied with.
Abandonment operates instanter. Where a miner
gives up his claim and goes away from it without any
intention of returning, and regardless of what may
become of it, or who may appropriate it, an
abandonment takes place, and the property reverts to
its original status as part of the unoccupied public
domain. It is then publici juris, and open to
location by the first comer.
Forfeiture is not complete until someone else
enters with intent to relocate the property.
Abandonment may occur at any time, even after
full compliance with the law as to performance of
annual labor. Forfeiture will only ensue upon the
lapse of the statutory period, on failure to represent
the claim, and upon entry and location by another.

-43-
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The language and holding of Knight v. Flat Top Mining
Co., 6 Utah 2d 51, 305 P.2d 503 (1957), show that this Court
makes the same distinction between the two doctrines.

In that

quiet title action, the trial court's finding that two claims
had been neither abandoned nor forfeited was sustained on
appeal, although no assessment work at all had been performed
for a period of several years until the assessment year
immediately prior to the time when an attempted relocation of
the claims was made.

This Court apparently thought that the

performance of assessment work, even though of disputed
character and following a period where no work at all was
performed on the claims, so clearly negatived the requisite
intent to abandon that abandonment was not even addressed as an
issue in the appellate opinion.
In the present case the performance of substantial
assessment work by appellants for the benefit of their claims so
plainly eliminated the issue of abandonment that any further
consideration of the issue by the trial court was improper.
Furthermore, it was manifest error for the trial court to use
evidence relating solely to the issue of abandonment as evidence
on the issue of the sufficiency of the assessment work to
prevent a forfeiture.

Indeed, the trial court's making of

inferences adverse to appellants from the temporary cessation of
active mining on the claims beginning in 1972 only compounded
the error.

As the Supreme Court of the United States has

recently noted, "(t]he holder of a federal mining claim, by
-44-
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investing $100 annually in the claim, becomes entitled to
possession of the land and may make any use, or no use, of the
minerals involved."

Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co.,

Inc., 98 S.Ct. 2002, 2009 (1978).
The inferences, made by the trial court from the
deterioration of corner and discovery monuments, were also
improper under the rule of law relating to the necessity for
maintenance of such monuments.

As stated by the Nevada Supreme

Court in Nichols v. Ora Tahoma Mining Co., 62 Nev. 343, 151 P.2d
615, at 622 (1944):
The general rule is that when a location is once
sufficiently marked on the surface so that its
boundaries can be readily traced, and all other acts
of location are performed as required by law, the
right of possession is fully vested in the locator,
and he cannot be divested of this right by the removal
or obliteration or destruction of the monuments,
stakes, marks or notices done without his fault, while
he continues to perform the necessary work upon the
claim.
(Citations omitted.)
This jurisdiction follows the same rule.

Miehlich v. Tintic

Standard Mining Co., 60 Utah 569, 211 P. 686, 690 (1922).
The Nevada court, in applying this rule to the facts of
that case which appear remarkably similar to those in the case
at bar, noted, at 151 P.2d 623:
When the Albert claims were originally located, the
requisite location monuments and markings were placed
upon the ground. Some of them were still there when
defendants' claims were located. The record does not
show that defendants took any notice of these
monuments, made .any inquiry of plaintiffs regarding
the boundaries of the Albert claims, or made any
attempt to ascertain the lines of the senior
locations.

-45-
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Accordingly, the Nevada court held that under the facts
presented, there was no abandonment or forfeiture validating the
claims subsequently located by defendants.
By not following these rules of law in the evaluation
and weighing of the evidence presented in the present case, the
trial court committed prejudicial error which demands reversal.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
BY NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE
OF APPORTIONMENT.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the trial
court correctly determined that the amount of assessment work
done on appellant's claims for the years in question was
insufficient in quantity to save all of appellant's claims from
relocation, there is yet another reason why the trial court's
decision must be reversed and the case remanded.

Under the

doctrine firmly established by this Court, acting unanimously,
in Utah Standard Mining Co. v. Tintic Indian Chief Mining &
Milling Co., 73 Utah 456, 274 P. 950 (1929), the district court
committed reversible error by failing to determine the value of
the assessment work indisputably performed by appellants, which
value should have been applied by the court to preserve a
corresponding number of appellants' claims actually benefitted
by this work from relocation by respondents.
-46-
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inadvertent failure of the trial court, inasmuch as appellants
formally objected to the absense of such findings from the
proposed findings of fact and cited Utah Standard as authority
in support of their position.
In Utah Standard, the plaintiff brought an action to
quiet title to ten unpatented mining claims which conflicted
with some 13 of 22 mining claims previously located by
defendants.

The plaintiff sought to prove that defendants'

claims were subject to relocation for failure to perform
assessment work.

Defendants introduced evidence at trial

establishing that they had excavated a tunnel for a distance of
about 75 feet at a value variously estimated at $25 to $30 per
foot and that about two miles of road leading to the claims had
been improved which roadwork was valued at six to nine hundred
dollars.

The plaintiff introduced evidence in rebuttal that led

the trial court to find that 62.2 feet of tunnel work was done
at a minimum value of $15 per foot for an undisputed value of
$930.

Apparently, the trial court did not find that the road

work conferred any value.

On appeal, this Court reversed the

decision of the trial court and remanded the case for a new
trial, apparently for a redetermination of the value of the work
indisputably performed.

In reaching this result, this Court

also held that even if the valuation figures determined by the
trial court were to stand, sufficient work was done to preserve
at least nine of the thirteen claims in conflict from
relocation.

At 274 P. 951, this Court noted:
-47-
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There is no principle of law that we are aware of
which asserts that, if the owner of a group of 22
claims undertakes to do the annual work for that
group, as a consolidated group, and performs only the
labor necessary for nine claims, he loses the benefit
of that work on nine claims, provided it is in fact
performed on one of the nine claims in such a way as
to benefit the remaining eight, as well as the one
upon which performed. In this case what is called the
"big tunnel" is located on Tintic Indian Chief Claim
No. 3, and projects slightly into the territory of
Tintic Chief No. 2. The work was performed upon the
claim which seems to be the most important one of the
group. Inasmuch as the defendants indisputedly [sic]
performed the work on this claim, they cannot lose the
benefit of it.
In the case at bar, it is likewise undisputed that
appellants performed significant assessment work.

Even

disregarding for the moment the substantial roadwork done within
the boundaries of one or more claims, which work was viewed with
a jaundiced eye by the trial court, appellants also stripped
overburden off potential ore bodies, construct·ed drill sites for
future drilling, some of which drilling was performed during
later assessment years, and did other work to preserve existing
mine workings.

No evidence was introduced by respondents to

show that either this work was not performed or that it had no
value for the mining claims.

Nevertheless, the trial court

refused to determine the value of this work in any year.
Appellants willingly concede that cost, defined as that
which was expended in terms of money for the performance of
assessment work, is not necessarily equal to the value of that
work.

Indeed, value may far exceed cost.

To quote Volume 2,

635, of Lindley's treatise at 1579:

-48-
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§

Mere expenditure is not of itself sufficient.
The work must tend to develop the claim and be of the
reasonable value claimed.
Cost is an element in establishing value, and
while not conclusive, strongly tends to establish the
good faith of the claimant.
It is not material whether the labor performed is
paid for or not, provided it is done at the
instigation of the owner. The fulfillment of the
provision of the law lies in the performance of the
labor or the making of the improvements required, and
not in the payment for it.
Therefore, under the facts here present, it could
hardly be controverted that the value of the assessment work
performed by appellants, including the supervisory component of
the work performed by appellant Silliman, substantially exceeds
the fifteen to twenty dollar per hour figure indicated by
respondents' evidence.

Thus, under the apportionment doctrine

of Utah Standard, even were there sufficient reason, which there
is not, to reject the fifty dollar per hour valuation of
appellants and to replace it with another slightly lower figure,
the decision of the trial court in this case must be reversed
for failure to preserve from relocation as many claims as would
qualify with a new valuation figure.
In this case it is not known whether the assessment
work of appellants was insufficient in quantity to cover all
their claims, because the trial court refused to make any
finding as to the work's value.

Following Utah Standard, a new

trial must be had for a determination of that value.
It should be noted, however, that inasmuch as not all
84 of appellants' claims were ever located over in any single
-49-
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year, the apportionment rule may well have no application to the
instant case.

CONCLUSION
For the trial court's failure to properly apply the
standards of law relating to the group development of claims
held in common, for its failure to properly allocate the burden
of proof, for its failure to make findings necessitated by the
doctrine of apportionment, and for manifest confusion on what
the facts were and on which facts were relevent to a
determination of the issues in this case, or for any one of
those errors, the trial court's decision should be reversed,
all findings vacated, and this matter remanded for a new trial
on the limited issue of compliance with the requirements of 30

u.s.c.

§

28.

Respectfully submitted this /~+~day of July, 1980.
SENIOR & SENIOR
By Brent D. Ward
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs - Appellants
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellants were served upon counsel for each of the
respondents by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Duane A.
Frandsen, of Frandsen, Keller & Jensen, attorneys for
Respondents Powells, Professional Building, Price, Utah 84501,
and to Aldine J. Coffman, Jr., of Coffman and Coffman, attorneys
for Respondents Teares, Rowes & Penromer, at 59 East Center
Street, Drawer J, Moab, Utah 84532, this

/

l:S +~

day of July,

1980.
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